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COMMENT
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, RETROACTIVITY, AND
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS: THE EFFECT OF LANDGRAF
V. USI FILM PRODUCTS AND RIVERS V. ROADWAY
EXPRESS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 1991' (the Act) made significant
changes to the major employment discrimination statutes. In
addition to restoring the law that was in effect prior to a num-
ber of Supreme Court decisions which eroded the civil rights
statutes,2 the Act also added remedies that were omitted from
previous legislation.' One important area that was unclear at
the time of the Act's passage was the issue of retroactivity. In
light of the Act's unclear legislative history,4  ambiguous
1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
2. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991) (holding that
Title VII does not apply to U.S. citizens in foreign countries); West Virginia Univ.
Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (holding that recovery of expert witness fees in
civil litigation could not be shifted to losing party pursuant to § 1988); Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (limiting the scope of § 1981); Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding that the statute of limitations
for challenging seniority systems begins to run at the time the seniority system is
adopted); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that challenging employment
decisions made pursuant to consent decrees is permissible); Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that the burden of proof in disparate impact
cases rests with plaintiff to demonstrate that it is the application of an employment
practice that has led to the disparate impact); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989) (holding that a defendant in a Title VII gender discrimination case may
avoid liability by showing the same decision would have been made without taking
gender into account).
3. See § 102 of the Act permitting compensatory and punitive damages for inten-
tional discrimination under Title VII; see also infra note 30 and accompanying text.
4. See infra part II.C.
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statutory language,5 and seemingly contradictory Supreme
Court precedent,6 the Act's retroactive nature has been widely
litigated7 and discussed.8
The Supreme Court ruled on the retroactivity issue in the
companion cases Landgraf v. USI Film Products9 and Rivers v.
5. See infra part II.B.
6. See infra part I.
7. As of April 1992, 53 federal district courts had ruled on the issue and refused
to apply the act retroactively according to Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d
1370, 1383-84 (8th Cir. 1992) (appendix). As of April 17, 1992, 84 federal courts had
ruled on the issue with 49 against and 35 for retroactive application according to the
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. See Ruth Marcus, A Percolating Le-
gal Dispute on Civil Rights: Government's Differing Positions on Issue of Retroactivity
Now Before Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1992, at A21.
8. See, e.g., James H. Coil III & Amy Weinstein, Past Sins or Future Transgres-
sions: The Debate Over Retroactive Application of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 18 Ehi-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 5, 25 (1992) ("Until the Supreme Court unravels the tangled mess
created by Congress, the retroactivity issue will continue to plague plaintiffs, employ-
ers, their lawyers, and the courts."); Janice R. Franke, Retroactivity of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 483 (1993); Jack M.H. Frazier & Michael A.
Dymersky, A Quandary of the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Is the New Law Retroactive?,
19 J.C. & U.L. 259 (1993); Daniel V. Kinsella, The Civil Rights Act and the Retroac-
tivity Muddle, 80 ILL. B.J. 500 (1992); Scott S. Moore, Retroactivity-the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 71 NEB. L. REV. 879 (1992); Richard L. Neumeier, Civil Rights Act Of
1991: What Does It Do? Is It Retroactive?, 59 DEF. COUNS. J. 500 (1992); Thamer E.
Temple HI, Retroactivity of the 1991 Civil Rights Act in Title WI Cases, 43 LAB. L.J.
299 (1992); David Allen, Comment, Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 44
BAYLOR L. REV. 569 (1992); Michele A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2035 (1992); Douglas B.
Kauffman, Comment, Retroactivity of the 1991 Civil Rights Act-That "Little" Issue
Congress Failed to Address, 23 CUMB. L. REv. 425, 425 (1992-1993) ("Every federal
court in the United States is now faced with the problem which this proposed amend-
ment presents. Why? Because Congress in this new civil rights legislation punted on
the question of whether or not the Act applies retroactively") (quoting King v. Shelby
Medical Ctr., 779 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ala. 1991)); Brian Neff, Comment, Retroactivity
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Opportunity for Reform, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 475
(1993); Karen R. Stein, Comment, Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991: A
Decision Not To Decide, 14 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 275 (1993); Daniel
P. Tokaji, Note, The Persistence of Prejudice: Process-Based Theory and the Retroactiv-
ity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 103 YALE L.J. 567 (1993); Linda Urbanik, Com-
ment, Executive Veto, Congressional Compromise, and Judicial Confusion: The 1991
Civil Rights Act-Does It Apply Retroactively?, 24 LOY. U. CI. L.J. 109 (1992); Rose
Mary Wummel, Note, Escaping the Dead Hand of the Past: The Need for Retroactive
Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 19 J. LEGIS. 223 (1993); Kristine N.
McAlister, Recent Development, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1319 (1992).
9. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
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Roadway Express, Inc."0 In these cases, the Court refused to
apply certain provisions of the Act to past conduct. In making
these rulings the Court defined a new approach to determine a
statute's retroactivity: a court must first determine the congres-
sional intent as to the retroactivity of the statute; if there is no
clear statement of such intent, the court will apply the statute
retroactively only if vested rights are not affected."
Examination of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the
Landgraf and Rivers decisions must begin with a general dis-
cussion of retroactivity. Courts have traditionally looked upon
the retroactive application of statutes with disfavor.'2 In fact,
several constitutional provisions specifically prohibit certain
types of retroactive legislation.'3 The constitutionality of retro-
10. 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
11. See infra part IV.
12. See, e.g., Ray H. Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legisla-
tion, 51 Nw U. L. REV. 540 (1956); Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960); Elmer E.
Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence,
20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936); Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5
TEX. L. REV. 229 (1927). This bias comes from a variety of factors, including the
ability to plan conduct with certainty of the legal consequences, the desire for stabili-
ty, fear of individualized legislation, and a strong common law tradition. Hochman,
supra at 692; see also Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61
TEX. L. REV. 425, 427 (1982) ("[Rletroactive lawmaking violates what is often called
the rule of law, namely, an entitlement of persons to guide their behavior by impar-
tial rules that are publicly fixed in advance.").
13. Article I of the United States Constitution prohibits both Congress (U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3) and the states from passing ex post facto laws. These
clauses are limited to penal legislation only. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-
91 (1798). Article 1, § 10, cl. 1 prohibits states from passing laws "impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." This clause is not interpreted literally. See, e.g., Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Other clauses may also implicate
retroactivity concerns. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (Takings Clause) and U.S. CONST.
art. I, §§ 9-10 (prohibitions on bills of attainder). The Due Process Clauses in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments also protect interests of fair notice and reliance.
"[A] justification sufficient to validate a statute's prospective application under the
[Due Process] Clause 'may not suffice' to warrant its retroactive application."
Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1497 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S.
1, 17 (1976)).
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active civil laws has been questioned in the past,4 although it
is now settled. 5
One definition of a retroactive statute is a statute that
changes the legal significance of pre-enactment conduct. 6 This
definition of retroactive legislation is problematic because it can
be read to encompass nearly all laws.' Therefore, rather than
determining the effect of a statute on pre-enactment conduct, it
is more helpful to determine the rights that must be protect-
ed. 8 Traditional definitions of retroactivity have shrouded the
analysis of the retroactivity question with conclusory terms 9
14. Compare Hochman, supra note 12, at 696-97 (asserting three factors to be
weighed in determining constitutionality: the nature and strength of the public inter-
est served by the statute, the extent to which the statute modifies or abrogates the
asserted pre-enactment right, and the nature of the right which the statute alters)
with Greenblatt, supra note 12, at 550 (approaching retroactive statutes not as a
"unique problem" but simply using general rules of statutory and constitutional inter-
pretation).
15. Constitutional challenges to retroactive civil legislation are no longer common
because the statutes are routinely upheld. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 275 (1988); see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 11.9, at 409 (4th ed. 1991) ("[Rjetroactive legislation does have to
meet a burden not faced by legislation that has only future effects.... But that
burden is met simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is
itself justified by a rational legislative purpose.") (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. R-A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984)).
16. Hochman, supra note 12, at 692. One commentator has further divided this
idea into three different concepts. A law is retroactive if it extinguishes legal rights
previously acquired, if it creates a current right or duty based on a previous act, or
if it gives a previous act the effect of creating a right or duty. Smith, supra note 12,
at 232-33. Another commentator has rejected Smith's division, saying that the differ-
entiation "is more confusing than useful. A distinction ... [that] seems to rest on
semantics." Greenblatt, supra note 12, at 544 n.22.
Another commentator has divided retroactive statutes into three different cat-
egories: "laws that alter the legal status . . .of some pre-enactment action or event [;
I. "laws that... make a legal judgment regarding that [preenactment] action
easier or harder to obtain; ... [and] laws that do not alter the preenactment status
of an action but substantially affect expectations stemming from that action." Munzer,
supra note 12, at 426.
17. "There is no such thing as a law that does not extinguish rights, powers,
privileges, or immunities acquired under previously existing laws. That is what laws
are for." Smith, supra note 12, at 233.
18. Greenblatt, supra note 12, at 544 n.22, 548.
19. The problems of retroactivity "lie mystically shrouded in the garb of such
conclusory legalisms as vested and nonvested rights, jurisdictional and statutory facts,
curative and non-curative legislation, and right and remedy." Id. at 540.
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without an explanation as to why a right must be protected.'m
Common distinctions include substance and procedure,2 vested
and nonvested rights,' and the relationship of the timing of
an Act's passage to the affected litigation's procedural
posture.2
While the Court in Landgraf and Rivers determined the
scope of the Act's provisions rather than the constitutionality of
an expressly retroactive version of the Act, the Court employed
the same language used by commentators discussing retroactivi-
ty in general. These definitional problems plagued the Landgraf
Court in its determination of the scope of the Act. The Court
based its decisions on conclusory legal terms and did not exam-
20. See Gregory J. DeMars, Retrospectivity and Retroactivity of Civil Legislation
Reconsidered, 10 OIO N.U. L. REV. 253, 274 (1983); Greenblatt, supra note 12, at
561-62; Gene A. Maguire, Note, Retroactive Application of Statutes: Protection of Reli-
ance Interests, 40 ME. L. REV. 183, 203 (1988). One theory is based on protecting
expectations that are both rational (based on a common interpretation of the law) and
legitimate (based on the purpose of the law). Even rational and legitimate expecta-
tions may be outweighed by societal interests. See Munzer, supra note 12.
21. "[Clourts relying on the substantive/procedural rights analysis have ignored
parties' reliance interests." Wummel, supra note 8, at 254.
22. Not allowing retroactive effect whenever "substantive" rights are involved
"fails to involve courts in any examination of the effects of particular laws and in-
stead applies a stringent and unyielding test.... With some statutes, however, ret-
roactivity can . .. actually serve the cause of legality. ... [I]t can serve to heal in-
fringements of the principles that like cases should receive like treatment." Hicks v.
Brown Group, Inc. 982 F.2d 295, 300 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heany, J., dissenting) (citing
Estrin, supra note 8, at 2048-50).
23. Retroactivity may be thought of as functioning differently in two different
situations: cases where the change occurs before the filing of a suit and cases where
the change is made after a suit has been filed but before final adjudication. A com-
mentator has indicated that the differing precedent of the Supreme Court, see infra
part I, can be reconciled based on when the change in law occurred.
Under Supreme Court precedent, the Bowen presumption against retroac-
tivity should apply only to those cases in which the change in statutory
law occurs before any adjudication of the dispute, while the Bradley pre-
sumption in favor of retroactivity should apply only to those cases in
which the change in statutory law occurs between the decisions of the
trial and appellate courts.
McAlister, supra note 8, at 1331. Treating these situations differently is illogical and
leads to unfair results. The retroactive nature of a law should either apply to both
situations or neither situation. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 854 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); McAlister, supra note 8, at
1332.
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ine the underlying rights affected by these particular cases and
the Act.'
The Act amended and expanded five important employment
discrimination statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII),' the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Section 1981),' the
employment provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA),2" the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976.' The Act's major provisions include permitting the
award of compensatory and punitive damages involving inten-
tional discrimination in Title VII and ADA cases," allowing
jury trials in those cases,3 restoring the scope of section 1981
claims to pre-1989 interpretation,32 and relaxing the plaintiffs
burden in disparate impact' 3 and mixed motive cases. 4
24. See infra part IV.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to bb-4 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
30. Before the Act, plaintiffs in Title VII cases were limited to equitable, "make-
whole" relief remedies in contrast to § 1981 claims where plaintiffs were entitled to
damages in addition to equitable relief. Section 102 of the Act authorizes plaintiffs in
Title VII and ADA actions to seek compensatory and punitive damages in cases of
intentional discrimination. The damages provisions are not available for disparate
impact or mixed motive actions and are limited to cases where the plaintiff can also
seek damages under § 1981. Furthermore, damages are limited to a specific dollar
amount based on the size of the employer. See Stuart H. Bompey & John D.
Giansello, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Analysis in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1991: ITS IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 100-02 (Law Institute
Handbook 429, 1992).
31. If the plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive damages, jury trials are
available for Title VII and ADA claims. Section 1981 plaintiffs retain the right to
jury trial. See id. § 103.
32. Section 101 of the Act was adopted in response to the Supreme Court's ruling
in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), which limited § 1981 by
holding that it "does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a con-
tract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obli-
gations." Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171. The Patterson decision was unexpected and limit-
ed § 1981 beyond the prevailing application by courts at that time. See Bompey &
Giansello, supra note 30, at 99. Section 101 of the Act was intended to restore §
1981 to its pre-Patterson status. Id. at 99-101. Section 101 defines the right to "make
and enforce contracts" to include "the making, performance, modification, and termina-
tion of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions
of the contractual relationship." Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)
(Supp. V 1993).
33. The disparate impact provisions of the Act are intended to restore the law to
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This comment explains that the Landgraf and Rivers deci-
sions do not adequately deal with the underlying purposes of
the Act. Part 11 examines the Court's test for determining con-
gressional intent in retroactivity cases. The Court considered
both the language and the legislative history of the Act while
professing to use a clear statement test. Part HI also notes that
the Court examined evidence far beyond the limits of such a
test while ignoring certain canons of statutory construction
usually 'associated with the clear statement approach. Since the
Court found no clear congressional intent, it had to apply a
judicial presumption as to the retroactivity of the statute.
Prior to Landgraf, the Court had utilized two conflicting
presumptions regarding the retroactivity of civil legislation.
Part HI reviews these differing presumptions, and Part IV ex-
amines how the Landgraf Court formulated a new test to recon-
cile the conflicting precedent. The new test relies on an artifi-
cial distinction that will cause lower courts difficulty in apply-
ing the test. The conflicting views of the majority and dissent,
while applying similar tests, nevertheless show the difficulty
that lower courts inevitably face. Part IV also analyzes the test
proposed in the Landgraf concurring opinion. This test, while
conceptually more satisfying, does not offer lower courts a clear-
er basis for decision. The underlying problems of the test laid
out in Landgraf are discussed in Part V. Even if the Court
developed a clearer test for the presumption of retroactivity,
that test would necessarily ignore the equities of any case in-
volved.
the state existing before the decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989). Under the Act, if a plaintiff shows a facially neutral practice has a
disproportionately adverse impact on the protected group, the employer must demon-
strate that the practice is related to the job in question and is a "business necessity."
The plaintiff can then show an alternative practice is available that would not have
the adverse impact but the employer did not adopt it. See Bompey & Giansello, supra
note 30, at 104-15.
34. Section 107 of the Act reverses the Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). A plaintiff will prevail by showing an employment
decision was motivated in part by an unlawful discriminatory reason. The protected
characteristic must only have contributed to the decision, it need not be the only
basis for it. See Bompey & Giansello, supra note 30, at 117-21.
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Part VI turns to the doctrine of continuing violations. Contin-
uing violations are used in employment decision cases to assign
liability to past conduct. Part VI addresses prior Court deci-
sions regarding the law of continuing violations and highlights
the interesting parallels between retroactivity and continuing
violations. Part VII suggests that the continuing violation theo-
ry may offer a basis for plaintiffs to recover damages for pre-
Act conduct even after the Landgraf and Rivers decisions. This
comment concludes with the proposition that Congress must
again address the issue due to the Court's recent restrictive
reading of the employment discrimination statutes.
IL. CONGRESSIONAL DETERMINATION OF RETROACTIVITY
A court must first determine congressional intent when
deciding whether a statute must be applied retroactively.'
One issue raised in Landgraf concerned which standard the
Court should use to examine that intent. Courts can examine
the issue of retroactivity through conventional statutory inter-
pretation, or they can require Congress to provide a clear state-
ment 8 of its intent for a statute to be applied retroactively.
Courts have traditionally employed a variety of methods to
determine the meaning of a statute. These methods include
looking to the plain language of the statute, the congressional
intent evidenced through legislative history, and the "spirit" or
"purpose" of the statute." In addition, courts have utilized the
35. "Where the congressional intent is clear, it governs." Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp. v. Boijorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990).
36. "[A] statute cannot be construed to operate retrospectively unless the legis-
lative intention to that effect unequivocally appears." Id. at 844 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439 (1935)); see also United
States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1928) ("statutes are not to
be given retroactive effect ... unless the legislative purpose so to do plainly ap-
pears"); United States Fidelity Guar. Co. v. United States ex rel Struthers Wells Co.
209 U.S. 306, 314 (1908) (examining the manifest intent of Congress to answer the
question of retroactivity); Murray v. Gibson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 421, 423 (1853) (apply-
ing a retroactive effect only if there is express language or "by necessary and un-
avoidable implication"); United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806)
(stating that statutes should not apply retroactively unless the text is "so clear,
strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them.").
37. See Philip P. Frickey, The Faegre & Benson Lecture: From the Big Sleep to
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traditional canons of statutory interpretation.8 Recently, the
Court has been more inclined to use a "literalist reading of
statutory terms" 9 to determine statutory meaning. A literalist
reading of statutes is Justice Scalia's only method of interpreta-
tion.4
In Landgraf, the Court purports to use a clear statement test
in examining the Act. The majority, however, examines evi-
dence that goes far beyond a pure clear statement approach.4'
Landgraf, therefore, leaves open the question of whether Con-
gress must offer a clear statement as to a statute's retroactivity
or if the Court may find retroactivity using other methods of
statutory interpretation.
A. Clear Statement Defined
The clear statement test, a manifestation of the new
textualism method of statutory interpretation,42 grew out of
the problems inherent in the traditional methods of ascertain-
ing congressional intent and purpose.' Limiting statutory in-
the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV.
241, 241 (1992).
38. See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STAT-
UTES 227 (1975); NORAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.01-
47.38 (5th ed. 1992).
39. Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation
in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 894 (1982).
40. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 621 (1990).
41. As Justice Scalia stated:
The Court, however, is willing to let that clear statement be supplied,
not by the text of the law in question, but by individual legislators who
participated in the enactment of the law, and even legislators in an earli-
er Congress which tried and failed to enact a similar law .... This
effectively converts the "clear statement" rule into a "discernible legisla-
tive intent" rule-and even that understates the difference.
Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1522 (Scalia, J., concurring).
42. See generally Eskridge, supra note 40.
43. See Frickey, supra note 37, at 249-51. The two other major schools of statu-
tory interpretation are purposivism and intentionalism. The purposivism school, em-
bodied in the works of Hart and Sacks, calls for interpreting statutes so that they
are rational and functional, in the same fashion as interpreting constitutions and
common law. Posner's "imaginative reconstruction," or intentionalism, encourages judg-
es to determine what the legislature would have decided if faced with the facts in
the case at hand. Id.
13711994]
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terpretation to only the text in question has been justified in
terms of separation of powers between Congress and the ju-
diciary and in terms of the institutional competence of the
different branches.'
The clear statement approach looks only to the words of the
statute, as "the text is all that the two houses of Congress vote
on and the President signs."45 The clear statement, or plain
meaning test, looks at the common definitions of the words
used, as well as several structural arguments.' While the
clear statement test has been criticized, 47 the Court professed
to adopt it in Landgraf.
B. Language of the Act
Consistent with the clear statement test, the Court in
Landgraf first looked at the language of the Act. The petition-
ers contended that the plain language indicated a congressional
intent for retroactivity.' The petitioner's argument relied on
the statement of section 402(a) that reads: "Except as otherwise
44. Note, supra note 39, at 900-04; see also Eskridge, supra note 40. Judges
should limit their power in interpreting statutes for several reasons: they are not
elected and should not subvert the will of the elected legislative branch; restrictive
judicial interpretation will force the legislature to directly address an issue; the legis-
lature can always overrule judicial statutory interpretations by amending the statutes
in question; legislative history is ambiguous and hard to determine for the institution
as a whole; and interpretations will be more predictable and certain. See, e.g.,
Frickey, supra note 37, at 253-54; William Luneberg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory
Interpretation, The Policies of Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 IND. L.J.
211 (1983); Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Con-
stitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160 (1990).
For the criticism that the clear statement test ignores the various obstacles
minority groups face in the political process, see Tokaji, supra note 8, at 570-71.
45. Frickey, supra note 37, at 254.
46. The structural arguments include how a word or phrase is used elsewhere in
the same statute or how it is used in other statutes; how possible meanings fit with-
in the statute as a whole (i.e., does one meaning render other provisions duplicative
or superfluous); and the interaction of different statutory schemes (assuming Congress
intends all laws to function together). Eskridge, supra note 40, at 660-62.
47. See generally Eskridge, supra note 40. The test has been criticized for being
too rigid, unrealistic for congressional processes, and uncritical. See, e.g., Frickey,
supra note 37, at 258; Note, supra note 39, at 905, 907. For reasons supporting the
clear statement test, see supra note 44.
48. "Petitioner's primary submission is that the text of the 1991 Act requires that
it be applied to cases pending on its enactment." Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1489.
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specifically provided, this Act ... shall take effect upon enact-
ment."49 By itself, this provision gives no indication that the
act applies retroactively.0 However, when read in conjunction
with two other sections of the Act, sections 402(b) and 109(c),
this provision could indicate retroactivity."l
Section 402(b) specifically prohibits retroactive application in
certain cases: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act,
nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for
which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for
which an initial decision was rendered after October 30,
1983. "52 This section was written to prevent application of the
Act in a specific lawsuit.' Section 109(c) exempts the portions
of the Act regarding overseas employers from applying retroac-
tively: 'The amendments made by this section shall not apply
with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enact-
ment of this Act." '
Sections 402(b) and 109(c) specifically preclude retroactivity.
If Congress, in certain sections, stated that the Act does not
apply retroactively, the maxim of expressio unuis est exclusio
alterius55 would indicate that sections which do not specifically
49. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 402(a) (emphasis added) (note to 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(Supp. V 1993)).
50. 'That language does not, by itself, resolve the question before us." Landgraf,
114 S. Ct. at 1493.
51. Although not addressed by the Court in Landgraf, the definition of "complain-
ing party" in § 102 can be read to preclude retrospective application. The term "com-
plaining party" is defined in part as "the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, the Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or proceeding under
Title VII... ." Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(d)(1) (emphasis added). This language
indicates that the statute only applies to persons who have not yet brought an ac-
tion. See Van Demeter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83, 85 (D.D.C. 1991).
52. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 402(b) (note to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993)).
53. "The parties agree that § 402(b) was intended to exempt a single disparate
impact lawsuit against the Wards Cove Packing Company." Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at
1493.
54. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109(c) (note to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp V 1993)).
55. The inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of others. For examples of
exclusio alterius arguments see, for example, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 46-47 & n.22 (1989); Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 571-74 (1989); Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees,
Local 1263, 484 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1988); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S.
105, 115-17 (1988); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 836-37
(1988); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 (1988); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 376-
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prohibit retroactivity should apply to preexisting claims. In
addition, if the Act did not apply retroactively except for sec-
tions 402(b) and 109(c), the language in those sections pre-
cluding retroactivity would be superfluous."
The Court rejected both the exclusio alterius argument and
the surplusage argument by claiming that sections 402(b) and
109(c) are "comparatively minor and narrow provisions in a
long and complex statute."57 The Court then stated that the
question of retroactivity was too important"5 to infer congres-
sional intent based on those statutory arguments." The Court
refused to "assume that Congress chose a surprisingly indirect
route to convey an important and easily expressed message"'
concerning the Act's effect on pending cases.
Even while claiming to follow a clear statement test, the
Court did not accept the structural arguments used to give
meaning to statutes. This suggests the Court was not actually
using a clear statement test. A likely reason is the Court's
feeling that retroactivity is a special case that does not fit into
normal methods of interpretation.
77 (1987) (plurality opinion). This canon was revived by the Court in 1974 in the
case of National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak),
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (citing Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282,
289 (1929)). See also Note, supra note 39, at n.28.
For an opinion criticizing exclusio alterius arguments, see In re American Re-
serve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1988). This canon has been condemned "be-
cause it is not a recognized precept of grammar or logic and poorly reflects the multi-
faceted decisionmaking structure of Congress." Eskridge, supra note 40, at 664.
56. The Court has said it would hesitate "to adopt an interpretation of a con-
gressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law."
Mackey, 486 U.S. at 837; see also supra note 46.
57. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1493.
58. "Applying the entire Act to cases arising from pre-enactment conduct would
have important consequences . . . ." Id.
59. "Given the high stakes of the retroactivity question, the broad coverage of the
statute, and the prominent and specific retroactivity provisions in the 1990 bill, it
would be surprising for Congress to have chosen to resolve that question through
negative inferences drawn from two provisions of quite limited effect." Id.
60. Id. at 1486.
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C. Legislative History of the Act6'
The Court, even though professing to use a clear statement
test, went on to examine the legislative history of the Act.62
The Court noted that Congress proposed the Act as a response
to a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting various civil
rights provisions.' A similar bill passed both houses of Con-
gress in 1990" but was vetoed by the President.'a Congress
narrowly failed to override the veto.'s One of the controversial
aspects of the. 1990 Act was its retroactivity provisions.' The
1991 Act did not contain these provisions. The Court used this
fact to discredit the petitioner's textual argument by stating:
"[h]ad Congress wished section 402(a) to have such a determi-
nate meaning, it surely would have used language comparable
to . . . the 1990 legislation. ... .8
61. For a general discussion of the political climate and the Act's passage, see
Tokaji, supra note 8, at 579-85.
62. This is one of the main differences between Justice Scalia's concurrence and
the majority opinions in Landgraf and Rivers. The majority's approach, while not a
strict clear statement test, is common. "In almost all of the leading plain meaning
cases of the Warren and Burger Courts, the Court checked the legislative history to
be certain that its confidence in the clear text did not misread the legislature's in-
tent." Eskridge, supra note 40, at 627. The court's delving deep into the legislative
history and the failure of the 1990 Act may also be an example of the "imaginative
reconstruction" school of interpretation. See id. at 630; see also supra note 43.
63. "The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is in large part a response to a series of deci-
sions of this Court interpreting the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964." Landgraf,
114 S. Ct. at 1489; see also supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
64. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). For a general discussion of the 1990
bill, see Cynthia L. Alexander, Comment, The Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990:
Wading Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 VAND. L. REV. 595 (1991).
65. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1492; 136 CONG. REC. S16,418 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1990) (mentioning "unfair retroactivity rules").
66. The override failed by one vote in the Senate. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1492;
136 CoNG. REC. S16,562, 16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
67. The Act provided that specified sections "shall apply to all proceedings pend-
ing on or commenced after" specified dates. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 15(a)(4)
(1990).
68. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1494. "In the absence of the kind of unambiguous
directive found in § 15 of the 1990 bill, we must look elsewhere for guidance on
whether § 102 applies to this case." Id. at 1496; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 441-43 (1987) ("Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling
than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silento to enact statutory
language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language." (quoting Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) (Stewart, J., dis-
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Members of Congress made conflicting statements as to the
intended retroactivity of the Act.69 For example, in the Inter-
pretive Memorandum of the meaning of the Act, two principal
sponsors differed on the retroactivity question. Senator
Danforth asserted that the new law should be applied prospec-
tively: "N]ew statutes are to be given prospective application
only, unless Congress explicitly directs otherwise, which we
have not done in this instance."70 Senator Kennedy, on the
other hand, concluded that the Act should apply retroactively:
"Many of the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are
intended to correct erroneous Supreme Court decisions and to
restore the law to where it was prior to those decisions. In my
view, these restorations apply to pending cases.... ."' Given
the confusion generated by the legislative history of the Act,72
there is ample reason to believe that Congress left the determi-
nation of retroactivity to the courts.73
D. Agency Interpretation
Interestingly, the Court did not address the issue of defer-
ence to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute.
senting))); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 67, 84-89 (1988). Using legislative inaction to determine congressional intent has
been criticized for ignoring the fact that Congress is a discontinuous, collective, and
public decisionmaker. Eskridge, supra at 94.
69. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1495-96.
70. 137 CONG. REC. S15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (interpretive memorandum
of Senator Danforth).
71. 137 CONG. REC. S15,963 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991) (interpretive memorandum of
Senator Kennedy).
72. For other statements advocating prospective only application, see 137 CONG.
REC. S17,685 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991) (Senators Levin and Rudman); 137 CONG. REC.
H9542, H9548-49 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (Representative Hyde); 137 CONG. REC.
S15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Senator Danforth); 137 CONG. REC. S15,472,
S15,478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (views of Senators Dole, Burns, Cochran, Garn,
Gorton, Grassley, Hatch, Mack, McCain, McConnel, Murkowski, Simpson, Seymour
and Thurmond). For other statements advocating retroactive effect, see 137 CONG.
REC. H9549 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (Representative Fish); 137 CoNG. REC. H9526,
H9530-31 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (Representative Edwards); 137 CONG. REC. S15,485
(daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Senator Kennedy).
73. See 137 CONG. REc. S15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Senator Kennedy) (stat-
ing "it will be up to the courts to determine the extent to which the bill will apply
to cases and claims that are pending on the date of enactment").
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) origi-
nally issued a policy statement that the Act did not apply retro-
actively.74 The EEOC then reversed its position in April 1993
and declared it would interpret the Act to apply retroactively.75
The EEOC also filed a joint amicus brief arguing in favor of
retroactivity in the Landgraf case.76
In Chevron, U.SA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.," the Court announced the following test to determine the
appropriateness of deference to an agency's interpretation: If
Congress has not clearly expressed its intent, the court must
determine whether the agency's construction of the statute is a
permissible one.78 If the agency interpretation is reasonable
and was committed to the agency's care by the statute, the
court should adopt it.79
Given the ambiguous legislative history and possible textual
interpretations, the agency's present construction of the statute
is reasonable. The question then becomes whether the retroac-
tive nature of the Act was committed to the agency's care. The
Court has allowed agency construction of statutes to expand an
agency's jurisdiction.'o Even though the EEOC policy state-
ment was not the result of the regular rulemaking procedure, it
is submitted that the policy statement should receive a degree
of deference from the Court.81
74. EEOC Policy Guidance on Retroactivity of Civil Rights Act of 1991, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at D-1 (Jan. 2, 1992).
75. EEOC Changes Retroactivity View Regarding 1991 Civil Rights Act, 61
U.S.L.W. 2593 (Apr. 6, 1993); EEOC Reiterates Vote to Change Policy on Retroactivity
of 1991 Civil Rights Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 71, at A-1 (Apr. 15, 1993).
76. U.S. Supreme Court Brief Filed by Federal Government in Landgraf v. USI
Film Products and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 84,
at D-24 (May 4, 1993).
77. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
78. Id. at 842-43.
79. Id. at 842-44.
80. Id. at 861.
81. But see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1992); Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agen-
cy Interpretations of Statutes? A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1275, 1296 (1991).
Another interesting consideration is the fact that the agency construction of the
statute changed dramatically with the new administration. For a related discussion on
how courts should deal with changing agency interpretations and judicial precedent
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III. COURT DETERMINATION OF RETROACTMTY: CONFUSING
PRECEDENT
By ignoring certain rules of statutory construction, the Court
was forced to determine the retroactivity of the Act by relying
on a judicial presumption. The Court recognized two presump-
tions regarding retroactivity of a statute. Cases favoring the
application of a statute retroactively are typified by the case of
Bradley v. School Board of Richmond.2 Cases favoring only
prospective application are typified by the case of Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital.' The past rulings of the
Court offer contradictory presumptions about retroactivity."
Analysis of the Supreme Court's major decisions on retroactivity
is important in understanding Landgraf.
A. Bradley: Presumed Retroactive
A line of cases culminating in Bradley v. School Board of
Richmond' demonstrates one of the judicial maxims concern-
ing presumed retroactivity of a statute. This maxim, which fa-
see Jahan Sharifi, Comment, Precedents Construing Statutes Administered by Federal
Agencies After the Chevron Decision: What Gives?, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 223 (1993).
82. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
83. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
84. In Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990), Justice
O'Connor mentioned the "apparent tension" between the two rules, but the Court
declined to "reconcile the two lines of precedent." Id at 837. Because the statute in
question showed a congressional intent (that it only be applied prospectively), the
Court did not need to apply either presumption in this case. Id.
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, directly faced the issue of the
Bradley/Bowen conflict. Recognizing that the cases "are in irreconcilable contradiction,"
Scalia called for the overruling of Thorpe and Bradley. Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at
841. Citing a long list of authority, Scalia concluded that the great weight of past
precedent was for applying laws prospectively only and that Thorpe and Bradley were
aberrations of the general rule. Id. at 840-54.
The cases may be reconciled by the fact that Bradley was interpreting a stat-
ute while Bowen dealt with administrative rulemaking. However, that distinction fails
to survive closer scrutiny. Both Thorpe and Bradley use the same presumption of
retroactivity even though one deals with a regulation and the other with a statute.
Thorpe and Bowen both deal with regulations but use different presumptions. Thorpe
stated that its reasoning "has been applied where the change was constitutional,
statutory, or judicial." Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 282.
85. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
vors retroactivity, states "a court is to apply the law in effect at
the time it renders its decision."
86
The presumption utilized by Bradley was first articulated in
United States v. Schooner Peggy." In Schooner Peggy, the
Court considered the applicability of a specific treaty in a case
involving the disposition of a captured French ship.' The trea-
ty was signed while an appeal was pending. 9 The Court ap-
plied the treaty, saying "if subsequent to the judgment and be-
fore the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be
obeyed."90 The treaty at issue in Schooner Peggy expressly
mandated retroactive application,9' and thus, the Court's hold-
ing did not reach the issue of applying new law in the absence
of express language.
In Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham,92 the Court
broadened the Schooner Peggy holding. The Court mandated the
use of Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
eviction procedures that required a hearing to explain the rea-
sons for eviction from public housing.93 HUD issued the proce-
dures while the case was pending appeal.' Even without ex-
press language that the requirements should apply retroactive-
ly, the Thorpe Court mandated their retroactive use.9 The
Court based this decision on the holding in Schooner Peggy'
but made no effort to explain why Schooner Peggy should apply
in cases where no express language supports retroactivity.
Bradley, a school desegregation suit against the School Board
of Richmond, Virginia, refined the retroactive presumption even
further. Relying on its equitable powers, the district court
86. Id. at 711.
87. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
88. Id. at 103.
89. Id. at 107.
90. Id. at 110.
91. Id. at 107.
92. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
93. Id. at 277-81.
94. Id. at 272.
95. Id. at 283.
96. Id. at 282.
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awarded the plaintiffs attorney's fees. 7 While the appeal was
pending, Congress passed a statute authorizing courts to award
attorney's fees in such cases. 8 Because nothing in the statute
mandated retroactive application, the circuit court refused to
apply the statute retroactively and reversed the district court's
award of attorney's fees.'
The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the award of
attorney's fees based on the presumption that "a court is to
apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, un-
less doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is stat-
utory direction or legislative history to the contrary.""0 The
Court listed three factors to consider when determining if retro-
active application would result in manifest injustice: (1) the
nature and identity of the parties, (2) the nature of the rights
affected, and (3) the nature of the impact of the change of law
on those rights.'' Applying these factors, the Court in
Bradley found no injustice in applying the attorney's fees provi-
sion retroactively." 2
Any statute analyzed under Bradley must be presumed retro-
active unless there is congressional intent to the contrary or
"manifest injustice" would result. Bradley does leave the Court
with a way to prevent the retroactive application of laws, but
the underlying presumption is that all laws act retroactively.
This base presumption conflicts with the presumption underly-
ing Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital.0 3
B. Bowen: Presumed Prospective
In contrast to the Bradley doctrine, a strong line of Supreme
Court precedent supports the rule that statutes should not
97. Bradley, 416 U.S. 696, 705-06 (1974)
98. Id. at 709.
99. Id. at 709-10.
100. Id. at 711.
101. Id. at 717.
102. Id. at 720-21.
103. 488 U.S. 204 (1988). See infra part III.C.
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operate retroactively.' The Court reaffirmed this proposition
in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital.0 5
In 1972, Congress authorized the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to promulgate regulations to limit the amount
Medicare would reimburse health care providers for services
rendered to Medicare beneficiaries.' 5 These cost-limit rules
were first implemented in 1974, and new schedules were issued
annually. 7 In 1981, the cost-limit schedule was based on dif-
ferent methods of calculation.0 8 Various hospitals in the Dis-
trict of Columbia area filed suit claiming this new index vio-
lated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 109 The court
agreed, and instead of appealing the decision, the Secretary
reverted to the old schedule."0 In 1984, the Secretary initiat-
ed a rulemaking procedure to reissue the 1981 cost schedule
retroactively."' The result of this rulemaking was the same
as if the original schedule had never been set aside."2
A group of seven hospitals who benefited from the invalida-
tion of the old index challenged the retroactive rule. The hospi-
tals claimed the retroactive rulemaking was invalid under both
the APA and the Medicare Act."
While the holding in Bowen was specific to statutes that
delegate authority to administrative agencies, the decision dem-
onstrates the Court's bias against retroactive legislation. Stating
that "[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law," the Court held
that "congressional enactments and administrative rules will
not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language
requires th[e] result.""4 In continuing with its broad language,
the Court stated: "The power to require readjustments for the
104. See generally Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827,
842-44 (Scalia, J., concurring).
105. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
106. Id. at 205-06.
107. Id. at 206.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 207.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 207-08.
114. Id. at 208.
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past is drastic. It ... ought not to be extended so as to permit
unreasonably harsh action without very plain words.""'
Finding no such "plain words" in the language of the rule,
the Court held that the Secretary had no authority to promul-
gate retroactive rules."' The Court's holding did not mandate
a presumption against retroactivity; it simply held that the
APA and the Medicare Act do not clearly delegate the authority
to enact retroactive rules.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia illustrated his clear
statement approach to statutory interpretation." ' The APA
defined the word "rule" as "the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or poli-
cy."" 8 Justice Scalia commented: "The only plausible reading
of the italicized phrase is that rules have legal consequences
only for the future.... In short, there is really no alternative
except the obvious meaning.""'
Even though the holding can be read narrowly, Bowen is
often cited for a presumption of prospective-only effect. This
presumption conflicts with the Bradley precedent. Interestingly,
the Bowen court failed to mention the Bradley decision.
C. Bennett: Attempts at Reconciliation
In 1985 the Supreme Court did not apply the Bradley pre-
sumption in Bennett v. New Jersey. ° Bennett involved an ac-
tion by the federal government to recover money granted to
New Jersey. The Court had to determine which federal regula-
tions specified the proper use of the money, those in effect at
the time of the grant or those in effect at the time of the
suit.
12 1
115. Id. (quoting Brimstone R.R. & Canal Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 104, 122
(1928)).
116. Id. at 215.
117. See supra part U.L
118. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 216 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988)).
119. Id. at 216-17.
120. 470 U.S. 632 (1985).
121. Id. at 633-34.
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, concluded that reli-
ance on the Bradley presumption would be "inappropriate." 2
O'Connor noted that the Bradley court expressly acknowledged
limits to the presumption." s For this reason, the Court re-
fused "to apply an intervening change to a pending action
where it has concluded that to do so would infringe upon or
deprive a person of a right that had matured or become uncon-
ditional."' The Bradley Court, however, did not discuss this
limitation or explain its scope in regard to the attorney's fees
provision at issue in that case.1
The Court went on to state, "This limitation comports with
another venerable rule of statutory interpretation, i.e., that
statutes affecting substantive rights and liabilities are pre-
sumed to have only prospective effect." 6 The Court declined
to explain the relationship of this rule with the holding in
Bradley." This substantive rights approach was eventually
adopted by the majority in Landgraf."
The Bennett limitation of Bradley was also applied in several
circuit court cases involving the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In
Vogel v. Cincinnati,9 the Sixth Circuit held that the Act did
not apply retroactively. In trying to reconcile Bradley and Bow-
en, the Sixth Circuit stated that Bradley "should... not be ap-
plied in contexts where 'substantive rights and liabilities,'
broadly construed, would be affected."'
In Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Service Co.,"3 ' the
Seventh Circuit also refused to apply the Act retroactively.
Relying on Bennett, the court held that the Thorpe-Bradley
presumption applies only when retroactive application of the
statute would not "infringe upon or deprive a person of a right
122. Id. at 638.
123. Id. at 639.
124. Id. (quoting Bradley, 416 U.S. 696, 720 (1974)).
125. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 720.
126. Bennett, 470 U.S. at 639.
127. See Neff, supra note 8, at 486.
128. See infra part IV.A.
129. 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992).
130. Id. at 598 (quoting United States v. Murphy, 937 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (6th Cir.
1991)).
131. 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992).
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that had matured or become unconditional.""2 The presump-
tion of prospective-only application was then extended to proce-
dural provisions on appeal. 3' By retroactively applying these
procedural provisions, substantive rights may be affected since
a new trial would likely be ordered."" This new trial would
create "manifest injustice" to the litigants.'35 In a strong dis-
sent, Judge Cudahy criticized the result as unjust, relying on
the fact that the conduct was proscribed at the time of occur-
rence and was not subject to penalty for the short time that the
Patterson case was controlling law. 3 6
IV. LANDGRAF: RECONCILIATION OR AN UNWORKABLE
DISTINCTION?
In Landgraf, the Court attempted to reconcile the differing
precedents of Bradley and Bowen by reading Bradley with the
Bennett limitation. As is evidenced by the disagreement be-
tween the majority and dissent, this attempted reconciliation
does not offer lower courts a clear method for applying a judi-
cial presumption.
A. Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion and Justice Blackmun's
Dissenting Vested Rights Analysis
1. The Facts of Landgraf
Barbara Landgraf worked at USI Film Products (USI) from
September 4, 1984 until January 17, 1986.' The evidence
showed that John Williams, a fellow employee, subjected
Landgraf to continuous and repeated "inappropriate remarks
and physical contact."' 3 After complaints to her supervisor
brought no results, Landgraf reported the incidents to her per-
132. Id. at 936 (quoting Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639 (1985)).
133. Id. at 937.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 940-41 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
137. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1488.
138. Id.
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sonnel manager.' Shortly after the personnel manager initi-
ated remedial actions, Landgraf resigned.' ° The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) determined that
Landgraf had been the victim of sexual harassment creating a
hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.' Landgraf
brought suit on July 21, 1989. The district court found
Landgraf had been the victim of sexual harassment; however,
she had not been constructively discharged.12
While Landgrafs appeal was pending, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.' Thus, she argued on appeal that
the damage and jury trial provisions of the 1991 Act'" should
apply to her case. 45 The Fifth Circuit concluded that neither
the jury trial provisions nor the damage provisions applied
retroactively to Landgras case.'
2. Laying Out the Test
Justice Stevens began his analysis of judicial presumptions
by stating "there is no tension between the holdings in Bradley
and Bowen."'47 After this assertion, Stevens went through a
discussion of the Court's preference for prospectivity' based
on the idea that "[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate
that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the
law is and to conform their conduct accordingly." 49
To conform to the principle of fairness, Justice Stevens chose
the narrow definition of retroactivity originally offered by Jus-
tice Story: "all statutes, which, through operating only from
139. I.
140. Id. The personnel manager conducted an investigation, reprimanded Williams
and transferred him to another department. I&
141. Id. (referring to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)).
142. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1488.
143. Id.
144. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993)..
145. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, Inc., 968 F.2d 427, 432-33 (5th Cir. 1992),
aft'd, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
146. Id- at 432.
147. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1496 (1994).
148. Id- at 1497; see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S.
827, 840 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
149. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1497.
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their passage, affect vested rights and past transactions."150 A
statute affects vested rights if "the new provision attaches new
legal consequences to events completed before its enact-
ment."'5 ' If a vested right is affected, the statute raises ret-
roactivity concerns, and the Court will not apply the statute to
past conduct without congressional intent. If a statute does not
affect vested rights, then it does not raise fairness concerns,
and it will be applied to past conduct.
Stevens then asserted that Bradley did not upset this general
reasoning.'5 ' He accomplished this by narrowly reading
Bradley to apply the presumption of retroactivity only in certain
situations, not in every situation as the broad maxim in
Bradley would suggest.' Stevens would apply the Bradley
presumption only in cases where vested rights are not affected.
Statutes that affect the legality of prospective relief (such as
authorizing the use of injunctions) do not affect vested
rights,TM nor do statutes changing jurisdiction.'55 In addition,
retroactivity concerns are generally not raised by changes in
procedural rules. "Because rules of procedure regulate secondary
conduct rather than primary conduct, the fact that a new
procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to
the suit does not make application of the rule at trial
retroactive." 5 '
150. Id. at 1499 (quoting Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F.
Cas. (C.C.D.N.H.) (No. 13,156) 756, 767 (1814) (interpreting ban on retrospective legis-
lation in the New Hampshire Constitution)).
151. Id.
152. "Our holding in Bradley is similarly compatible with the line of decisions
disfavoring 'retroactive' application of statutes." Id. at 1503.
153. Stevens limits Bradley by applying the "maxim not to be disregarded that
general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in
which those expressions are used." Id. at 1497 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)).
154. See id. at 1501. Passage of § 20 of the Clayton Act which governed injunctive
relief against labor picketing could be applied to pending cases because "relief by in-
junction operates in futuro." American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Coun-
cil, 257 U.S. 184, 201 (1921).
155. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1501-02. "Application of a new jurisdictional rule
usually 'takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to
hear the case." Id. at 1502 (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508
(1916)).
156. Id. at 1502.
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In footnote twenty-nine of the opinion, 5 7 however, Stevens
gave examples of some exceptions to this procedural test: "A
new rule concerning the filing of complaints would not govern
an action in which the complaint had already been properly
filed under the old regime, and the promulgation of a new rule
of evidence would not require an appellate remand for a new
trial."" In addition, amendments to federal procedural rules
apply retroactively only if "just and practicable."'59 Stevens
also stated, in apparent conflict with earlier statements, that
the Court does "not restrict the presumption against statutory
retroactivity to cases involving 'vested rights.'... Nor do we
suggest that concerns about retroactivity have no application to
procedural rules."
60
Stevens appeared to construct a framework for determining
when retroactivity concerns were warranted. If a statute affects
a person's vested rights, then retroactivity would not be pre-
sumed. One method of determining if vested rights are affected
is whether the statute changes procedural rules or substantive
rights. But in footnote twenty-nine, Stevens retreats from this
general rule. After reading this footnote, it is not clear which
test the Court is using.
Stevens then compared Thorpe and Bradley to the vested
rights framework, and he interpreted Thorpe as involving pro-
cedural issues regarding the requirement of a hearing. 6' This
interpretation appears to be in line with his original substan-
tive/procedural distinction. Bradley involved attorney's fees that
were "collateral to the main cause of action."62 In addition,
the Court was already allowed to award attorney's fees pursu-
157. Id. at 1502 n.29.
158. Id.
159. Id. (quoting Order Amending Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 495 U.S.
969 (1990)). This test may be similar to the "manifest injustice" test articulated in
Bradley.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1502-03. The Court in Thorpe may have also allowed retroactive appli-
cation to avoid determining the constitutionality of the prior eviction procedures or
because of equitable concerns about the fairness of private parties dealing with old
rules subsequently replaced with new rules by the government. Id. at 1503 n.30.
162. Id. at 1503 (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec., 455
U.S. 445, 451-52 (1982)).
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ant to its power to grant equitable relief.' Therefore, the
statute affected no vested rights. It is unclear how the Bradley
case fits into the substantive/procedural distinction and how to
distinguish the attorney's fees provisions from the compensatory
damages provisions at issue in Landgraf.
3. Applying the Vested Rights Test to the Civil Rights Act of
1991
The Court applied the vested rights test to each provision of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act separately.'64 Two sections of the
Act were "readily classified."'65 The first, section 102(c)(1), in-
troduces a right to jury trial.'66 If this section simply autho-
rized the right to a jury trial, it would apply to cases filed
before and tried after the passage of the Act since it is a proce-
dural change.'67 But because section 102(c)(1) conditioned the
right of a jury trial on other provisions of the Act, the "jury
trial option must stand or fall with the attached damages
provisions." 6 Section 102(b)(1) authorizes punitive damages
in cases of malice or reckless indifference.6 9 Because of the
similarity between criminal sanctions and punitive damages, a
vested right is clearly involved, and a clear congressional intent
must be shown.'
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1505.
165. Id.
166. "If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this
section-(1) any party may demand a trial by jury.... " Civil Rights Act of 1991, §
102(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
167. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1505.
168. Id.
169. "COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES.-(1) DETERMINATION OF PUNITE
DAMAGES.-A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section
against a respondent ... if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent
engaged in discriminatory practice . . . with malice or with reckless indifference to
the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." Civil Rights Act of 1991, §
102(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
170. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1505-06. Even with clear congressional intent, this
section may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. See supra note 13.
The Court declined to address this issue because there was no clear congressional
intent that the clause operate retroactively. Id.
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A third section could not be so readily classified. Section
102(a)(1), at issue in Landgraf, authorizes the recovery of com-
pensatory damages. 71 While recognizing that the recovery of
compensatory damages is authorized only for conduct that had
previously been prohibited,172 the Court refused to apply sec-
tion 102(a)(1) to past conduct. Stating that compensatory dam-
ages are "quintessentially backward-looking,"'73  the Court
ruled that the imposition of compensatory damages, by creating
a remedy where there was none, essentially creates a new
cause of action.74 USI took measures to remedy the situation
before the problem reached a stage where they would have
been liable under the old statute. Attaching liability to their
actions in this case would upset their expectations of the
law. 7
5
The problem with the vested rights analysis used by Stevens
is that it does not offer a clear method of determining what
laws will be presumed to have retroactive effect. The respon-
dent in Landgraf had no right to discriminate against Landgraf
either before or after the passage of the Act. The Act merely
gave the petitioner compensation for previously illegal conduct.
It is not clear why this would upset an employer's expectation
of the law or how an employer's behavior would change based
on the new liability. It is also unclear why expectations of the
law would be affected differently when faced with the liability
for compensatory damages rather than attorney's fees.
4. Blackmun's Dissent Shows a Flaw in the Vested Rights Test
This is precisely the point Justice Blackmun made in his
dissent. 76 Blackmun rejected the majority's contention that
171. "RIGHT OF RECOVERY.--(1) CIVIL RIGHTS-In an action brought by a complain-
ing party ... against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimina-
tion . .. the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as
allowed in subsection (b).... " Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
172. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1506.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. & n.35.
176. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1508 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the plain language of the statute did not show congressional in-
tent to apply the statute retroactively.'77 But "[elven if the
language of the statute did not answer the retroactivity ques-
tion, it would be appropriate under our precedents to apply
section 102 to pending cases."'78 Since there "is no such thing
as a vested right to do wrong,"'79 no expectations will be un-
settled by the compensatory damage provision. No conduct
would have changed due to the Act, and therefore, no vested
rights would be affected.
B. Justice Scalia's Primary Conduct Analysis in Concurrence
Justice Scalia also noted this problem in his concurring opin-
ion. 80 Scalia pointed out the inconsistencies in the majority's
opinion between the stated rule and the exceptions listed in
footnote twenty-nine. 8' Because of the inconsistency, Scalia
proposed a different rule. Scalia would not allow any statute to
act on past conduct absent clear congressional intent.'82 How-
ever, the act must be examined to determine the primary con-
duct regulated and when the primary conduct occurs."
For example, a statute changing jurisdiction would apply to
all actions from the moment it was passed."u The conduct
regulated by the statute is judicial action.'85 Applying a ju-
risdictional change immediately may change where an individu-
al files suit but would not affect any past judicial action. 6'
Justice Scalia never came to a conclusion about attorney's
fees provisions because determining the regulated conduct is
difficult.'87 He tried to differentiate between the purposes of
encouraging people to file suits and facilitating suits already in
177. Id. at 1508-09; see also supra part I.
178. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1509 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1510 (quoting Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 160, 175 (1865)).
180. Id. at 1522, 1524.
181. Id. at 1524.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1524-26.
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progress." If the purpose of the award is to encourage suits,
the primary event would be the filing of the suit, and all suits
filed after passage of the change would be eligible for fees." 9
However, if the purpose of the award is to facilitate suits, the
primary event would be the termination of the suit and all
suits pending during passage would be eligible. 9 ' This distinc-
tion makes little, if any, sense. First, most statutes do not have
specific language indicating the specific intent of each provi-
sion."' In addition, Congress would likely have both purposes
in mind. Under the primary conduct analysis offered by Scalia,
it is not clear how the Court would rule on specific provisions.
Even if attorney's fees present a difficult situation, Justice
Scalia stated that "[o]rdinarily... the answer is clear."'92
Scalia determined the primary conduct involved in Landgraf is
the prevention of discriminatory conduct, and therefore the Act
only applies to conduct occurring after its passage.9 '
C. Rivers and Curative Legislation
The first application of the Landgraf test occurred in the
companion case of Rivers v. Roadway Express.' Rivers in-
volved the application of section 101 of the Act. Section 101
changed § 1981's 95 prohibition of racial discrimination in the
making and enforcement of contracts to involve all phases of
the contractual relationship.'98
Maurice Rivers and Robert Davison were employed as garage
mechanics by Roadway Express.'97 On August 22, 1986, Road-




191. Since Justice Scalia does not interpret statutes by looking beyond iheir plain
language, it is not clear how he would determine the purpose of a specific provision.
For a discussion of the clear statement test, see supra part H.L
192. Id. at 1526.
193. Id.
194. 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
196. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1513-14.
197. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1513.
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hearings. 9 ' They refused to attend because they did not re-
ceive their contractually required two days written notice.'
As a result they were suspended but were eventually awarded
back pay based on successful grievances.0 Then, Roadway
managers again told Rivers and Davison to attend disciplinary
hearings without the required notice."0' When Rivers and
Davison again refused to attend, they were discharged."2
Rivers and Davison filed a complaint alleging that they were
discharged based on their race, and they insisted on the same
notice of hearings afforded white employees.0 3 Before the trial
began, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union."' That ruling reformulated the common
interpretation of § 1981 claims.0 5 On the basis of the
Patterson decision, the district court dismissed the § 1981
claims." After a bench trial on Rivers' and Davison's Title
VII claims, the court entered judgment for the defendant.0 7
On appeal, Rivers and Davison argued two points. They first
argued that their discharge claims fit the Patterson definition of
§ 1981.08 They then asserted that their discharge claims were
also allowed under section 101 of the new Civil Rights Act."°
The Sixth Circuit dismissed the claims based on the 1991 Act
but remanded the claim for a jury trial because the discharge
fit under the Patterson § 1981 definition.210 The Supreme
Court issued certiorari on the sole question of whether section







204. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
205. See id.
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Statutes enacted to restore a prior understanding of the law
are called curative statutes.2" Curative statutes are usually
applied retroactively because they restore expectations rather
than unsettle them.213 In Rivers, the discriminatory conduct
took place before Patterson. The Act merely restored the notion
of § 1981 claims as they existed before Patterson, when the
conduct took place.
The Court in Rivers, however, rejected the notion that a
statuie designed to cure an incorrect interpretation by a court
shows an intent that the statute apply retroactively.214 Find-
ing no clear statement that the Act apply retroactively and
relying on Landgrafs presumption of prospective-only effect in
areas of vested rights,215 section 101 was found not to be ret-
roactive. The Rivers decision ignores the purpose of section 101
of the Act which is to restore the interpretation of § 1981 to
pre-Patterson status.
V. RETROACTMTY ANALYSIS AFTER LANDGRAF AND RIVERS
A. Statutory Interpretation of the Act
Congress could not decide the retroactive nature of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Given the history of the Civil Rights Act of
1990 and the political compromises that formed the Act of 1991,
Congress was clearly reserving the issue for the courts. In
212. Curative statutes may act in several ways. They may restore prior agree-
ments of individuals which were not effective due to procedural defects. They may
correct statutes worded incorrectly, or they may restore interpretation of a statute
after an incorrect court ruling. See, e.g., 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 678;
Hochman, supra note 12, at 703-06.
213. See Hochman, supra note 12, at 705; Munzer, supra note 12, at 468.
214. "Because retroactivity raises special policy concerns, the choice to enact a
statute that responds to a judicial decision is quite distinct from the choice to make
the responding statute retroactive." Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1515.
215. There is some question as to whether the rights affected in Rivers should be
classified as vested. As noted earlier, § 101 merely restored the notion of § 1981
claims to include conduct that was proscribed when it occurred. The Court in Rivers,
however, said "because § 101 amended § 1981 to embrace all aspects of the contrac-
tual relationship, including contract terminations, it enlarged the category of conduct
that is subject to § 1981 iability.... [Tihe important new legal obligations § 101
imposes bring it within the class of laws that are presumptively prospective." Id.
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Landgraf, however, the Court implied that the issue of retro-
activity is a special situation that cannot be resolved with tra-
ditional statutory interpretation. The Court ignored its own
clear statement test by examining legislative history, ignored its
own rules of statutory construction that invoke the canon of
exclusio alterius, and ignored its own rules of deference to ad-
ministrative agencies. After the Landgraf decision, it is unclear
to what extent the Court will examine congressional intent, but
it seems unlikely that a statute will be presumed to operate
retroactively without specific language to that effect.
B. Applying the Vested Rights Analysis
The framework the Court initially laid out does not apply a
presumption of retroactivity if "it would impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions
already completed."216 The application of this test is unclear.
The Court ruled that the compensatory damage provision of the
Act increases the party's liability for their past conduct and
therefore cannot apply retroactively. The Court does not suffi-
ciently distinguish compensatory damages from an award of
attorney's fees.217 It is not clear if the amount of liability is
the difference (a lawyer's fees provision may be a comparatively
small increase in liability compared to compensatory damages)
or if the difference is that courts already had equitable powers
to grant attorney's fees before the statutory change.
The Court attempted to form a substantive/procedural differ-
entiation21 but almost immediately retreated from such a
blanket rule.1 9 Any substantive/procedural differentiation is
bound to cause problems for a lower court. For example, in
reference to the compensatory damages provisions in the Act,
one court stated "[tihere can be no dispute that a right to seek
compensatory damages in a jury trial is a major substantive
216. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1505.
217. The Court distinguished the two awards by saying that attorney's fees are
"collateral to the main cause of action." Id. at 1503.
218. See supra notes 147-56, 161-63 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
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provision.""0 Another court characterized the same provisions
by stating "compensatory damages and jury trials are not sub-
stantive rights... these rights are remedies and procedural
rights."2
1
The Court based its objection to retroactivity on the fact that
parties' expectations of the law may be unsettled. As Justice
Blackmun's dissent shows, it is unclear what this unsettling
effect would be. It is not easily understood how or why parties
would have changed their actions based on a knowledge of the
liability since the underlying conduct was unlawful before the
passage of the Act.' It is true that added liability may have
an increased deterrent effect on discriminatory behavior, but, as
Justice Blackmun points out, "there is no such thing as a vest-
ed right to do wrong,"' and parties should not need added
deterrent to stop a practice that had been illegal for some
time.' This seems especially true in the Rivers situation.
In Landgraf, therefore, the Court attempted to reconcile pre-
cedent that offered two seemingly contradictory presumptions of
retroactivity. The vested rights analysis used by the majority
suggests that substantive changes in the law should not be
retroactive unless there is clear congressional intent. Procedural
changes, on the other hand, may be applied retroactively. As
the Court discovers, this distinction is not always clear.
Attorney's fees provisions do not affect vested rights and can
act retroactively, but compensatory damages do affect vested
220. Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077, 1081 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1992);
see also Sudtelgte v. Sessions, 789 F. Supp. 312, 315 (W.D. Mo. 1992) (awarding
damages perspectively only).
221. United States v. Department of Mental Health, 785 F. Supp. 846, 853 (E.D.
Cal. 1992); see also Lee v. Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 921, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding
that compensatory damages are authorized under a procedural and remedial statute).
222. "M[The court finds it unlikely defendant would have acted differently had it
known its full potential liability." Graham v. Bodine Elec. Co., 782 F. Supp. 74, 77
(N.D. IlM. 1992).
223. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1510 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Freeborn v. Smith, 67 U.S. (2 Wall.) 160, 175 (1865)).
224. It may be that some individual's interests that were unsettled due to Su-
preme Court decisions interpreting the Civil Rights Act were restored by the 1991
amendments. Applying the amendments retroactively would actually protect interests
that arose before 1989. See Estrin, supra note 8, at 2074; supra notes 212-13 and
accompanying text.
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rights and cannot act retroactively. The primary conduct analy-
sis proposed by Justice Scalia may offer a more workable solu-
tion to the retroactivity question, but it too has trouble in cer-
tain situations.
The formulaic tests laid out in Landgraf and Rivers neglect
to examine the equities in each specific case. In both Landgraf
and Rivers, the law proscribed the employers' conduct. The
remedies offered by section 102 to Landgraf would have in-
creased her employer's liability but would not have affected the
employer's conduct. The situation in Rivers is even clearer. The
Act restored the party's expectations of the law at the time the
conduct occurred.
The test defined in Landgraf is unclear both as a distinction
between substance and procedure and in terms of a substantive
or vested rights analysis. Even if the test were clear, any bright
line test fails to examine the specific situation of the case at
hand, and it fails to ensure that the parties in the case are
treated fairly.
VI. CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
Continuing violation cases offer an interesting parallel to the
retroactivity cases. In each situation, events that were not the
subject of a valid claim are subject to penalty. The same lan-
guage and terms are used in both types of cases. A continuing
violation is a series of discriminatory acts which constitute a
pattern of violation or the maintenance of an unlawful practice
or policyY5 The continuing violation theory is used to extend
the charge-filing deadlines for discriminatory acts and to allow
suits when the normal time limitations have passed."6 Charg-
es brought under continuing violation theory are based on past
events, and these past events can be subject to sanctionsY
225. MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION §
12.4(4) (1994).
226. See id.
227. See id.; BARBARA L. SHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 1043 (1983).
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Continuing violation cases fit into three common situations. If
an act occurs within the charge-filing deadline that either (1) is
part of a pattern of discrimination; (2) shows the maintenance
of a discriminatory system such as seniority or promotion sys-
tems; or (3) gives present effect to past discrimination, then
past acts may be subject to liability.'
In the 1977 decision of United Air Lines v. Evans,229 the
Supreme Court essentially discredited the third category of
continuing violation claims. In 1968, the plaintiff Carolyn Evans
had been forced to resign her stewardess position based on the
airline's no marriage rule."0 Evans was rehired in 1972 but
without benefit of her previous seniority."' After United failed
to credit her with her pre-1972 seniority, Evans filed a discrimi-
nation charge. Evans claimed that the failure to credit her with
the seniority gave "[a] present effect to the past illegal act."2
After initially affirming the district court's dismissal of the
charge based on the non-timely filing of the complaint, the
Seventh Circuit reheard the case after the Court's decision in
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. 3
In Franks, the Court upheld the award of retroactive seniori-
ty to a class of black applicants who had been denied truck
driving jobs.' In upholding the award, the Court stated that
the central purpose of Title VII is to "make persons whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimina-
tion." 5 The court went on to state that "[aldequate relief may
228. SHLEi & GROSSMAN, supra note 227, at 1046.
229. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). Before Evans, the continuing violation theory encom-
passed a series of acts against different employees that evidenced a pattern of dis-
crimination. See, e.g., Melani v. Board of Higher Educ., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
11,068 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding that a refusal to hire women may be considered a
continuing pattern of discrimination); Jamison v. Olga Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 454
(S.D. W. Va. 1971) (finding that the employer may have engaged in a pattern or
practice of denying employment for promotions to blacks, which is actionable under
Title VII).
230. Evans, 431 U.S. at 554. The no marriage rule was held to violate Title VII in
Sprogis v United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
231. Evans, 431 U.S. at 555.
232. 431 U.S. at 557.
233. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
234. Id. at 757-70.
235. Id. at 764.
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well be denied in the absence of a seniority remedy slotting the
victim in that position in the seniority system that would have
been his had he been hired at the time of his application."23'
Based on Franks, the Seventh Circuit ruled that Evans' claim
was not time-barred because the present denial of seniority "is
an instrument that extends the impact of past discrimina-
tion." 7
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed but conceded that
the seniority system gave a present effect to the past discrimi-
nation." Because Evans had not filed a complaint within the
time period after her discharge, the discriminatory discharge
must be treated as lawful.2 9
A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a
timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act
which occurred before the statute was passed. It may con-
stitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in
which the status of a current practice is at issue, but sepa-
rately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event in his-
tory which has no present legal effect." °
The seniority system as it operated does not constitute a "pres-
ent violation,""' and therefore was not a continuing violation.
The Court distinguished Franks, stating that it dealt with a
"remedy issue," not a "violation issue." 2 The dissenting Jus-
tices would not have barred Evans' claim based on the fact that
she was subject to the effects of the past discrimination at the
present time. 3
The parallels between Evans and Landgraf are clear. Each
woman was subject to court-determined discrimination. Each
woman sought relief based on past events that were unlawful.
In Evans' case, the past events had not yet been deemed un-
236. Id. at 764-65.
237. Evans v. United Airlines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247, 1250 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 431
U.S. 553 (1978).




242. Id. at 559.
243. Id. at 560-61.
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lawful, while in Landgrafs case, the remedies were not yet law.
The language in Evans clearly equates the two situations, stat-
ing that they are "the legal equivalent" of each other. Landgraf
and Evans seem to be in complete agreement.
However, in Bazemore v. Friday,2' the Court seemed to
turn its back on the Evans rule. Before the effective date of
Title VII, the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service
maintained two racially segregated branches with black employ-
ees receiving lower wages than comparable white employ-
ees.2" The two branches were merged in response to Title VII,
but the salary inequities remained.' " The Court held that the
maintenance of the salary differences was actionable even
though it dated from pre-Act conduct. 7
The Court distinguished Evans by determining that the se-
niority system in Evans did not presently discriminate because
it treated all employees similarly regardless of their sex.'
The salary structure in Bazemore, however, is a present viola-
tion because "[elach week's paycheck that delivers less to a
black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable
under Title VII."2" The COurt ruled that the Fourth Circuit's
error in ruling that the present salary system is not a present
violation "is too obvious to warrant extended discussion."20 In
both Evans and Bazemore, the employees were subject to dispa-
rate treatment in pay and benefits based on actions that oc-
curred before the time of the filing of the complaint. Both em-
ployees were subject to the continuing effects of the violation,
yet only one of the employers was subject to penalties.
The Court again ruled on the continuing violation theory in
Florida v. Long." Men received lower state pension benefits
than women before the practice was clearly outlawed in Arizona
Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred
244. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
245. Id. at 394.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 395.
248. Id. at 396 n.6.
249. Id. at 395.
250. Id.
251. 487 U.S. 223 (1988).
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Compensation Plans v. NorrisY2 The Long Court had to de-
cide at what date the state was required to provide equal bene-
fits and whether employees who retired before that date were
entitled to adjusted benefits.253
At first glance this case seems similar to Bazemore because
each check received by the pensioners created another wrong
that should be actionable. The Court differentiated Bazemore by
finding that pension systems are funded on an actuarial basis
and are based on a past assessment of an employee's
service.' The payroll system in Bazemore was individually
determined based on a present analysis of an employee. 5
Florida was not required to provide equal benefits until after
the Norris decision, when it was made clear that such systems
were unlawfulY6 Employees who retired before Norris were
not entitled to increased benefits to remedy the past discrimina-
tion."
In denying increased benefits to employees who retired before
Norris, the Court used the language of retroactivity: "It is es-
sentially retroactive to disrupt pension funding assumptions by
requiring further adjustments based on conduct that could not
reasonably have been considered violative of Title VII at the
time retirements occurred and funding provisions were
made." 8 The decision of whether the adjustments could be
applied to past retirees was based on the state's expectations at
the time of the retirements. 9 It was precisely on the issue of
expectations that the dissenting justices disagreed.6  Justice
Blackmun would have required pension adjustments for all re-
tirees who retired after the Court's decision in Los Angeles
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart.26 In Manhart, the
Court ruled that pension plan contributions could not be dif-
252. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
253. Long, 487 U.S. at 225.
254. Id. at 239.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 237-38.
257. Id. at 240.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 239-40.
260. Id. at 240-41.
261. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
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ferentiated on the basis of gender.2 Justice Blackmun be-
lieved that this made the law sufficiently clear to put Florida
on notice that its pension plan distributions were violative of
Title VII. Justice Blackmun also mentioned the expectation
approach:
Although retroactive relief is not mandatory in a Title VII
case,... the make-whole purpose of Title VII creates a
"presumption in favor of retroactive liability [that] can sel-
dom be overcome." [Iln the context of pension plans .. .the
presumption of retroactive liability may be defeated if the
relevant law concerning Title VII was not sufficiently clear
at the time of the violation.2
Justice Stevens would have ruled that "failure to 'top-up' the
pre-Manhart retirees' future benefit payments is akin to the
perpetuation of past discrimination that we condemned in
Bazemore."26 5
Interestingly, one of the Court's decisions "overruled" by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 is the continuing violation case of
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies.2 6 Lorance severely limits con-
tinuing violation theory in challenging seniority systems. Three
women challenged an AT&T seniority plan as being the product
of a "conspir[acy] to change the seniority rules, in order to pro-
tect incumbent male testers and to discourage women from pro-
moting into traditionally-male tester jobs."6 7 The women were
not affected by the change in the seniority system until they
were demoted three years after the system took effect.2' They
claimed that any demotion based on the seniority system was
an intentionally discriminatory alteration of their contractual
rights.26 9 The Court disagreed, saying that the seniority sys-
tem was facially neutral and mere adherence to that system
262. Id. at 714-18.
263. Long, 487 U.S. at 240-41.
264. Id. at 241 (Blackmunn, J., dissenting) (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 719).
265. 487 U.S. at 248 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
267. 490 U.S. at 903.
268. Id. at 902.
269. Id. at 905.
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was not a present violation.7 ° Section 112 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 amended Title VII to change the effective date for
the running of the limitations period.2 ' Section 112 essen-
tially codified the pre-Lorance continuing violation theory for
challenges to seniority systems.
In both retroactivity and continuing violation situations, the
Court precedent is confusing and conflicting. Both situations
rely on the importance of stable expectations given a certain
course of conduct.
VIi. LANDGRAF'S EFFECT ON CONTINUING VIOLATION THEORY
In a continuing violation case, the employer must commit a
violation of current law. Damages for past unlawful actions will
not be granted if a timely charge was not filed. In a retroactivi-
ty situation, even if the employer committed acts which were
unlawful at the time (as in Rivers) and a timely complaint is
filed, the employer will not be liable for damages based on
unlawful conduct if the basis for the claim is a law that was
enacted after the conduct occurred.
The continuing violation theory may, in certain instances,
offer a plaintiff a claim to recover damages for pre-Act conduct
when a straight claim under the 1991 Act would not. If plain-
tiffs can demonstrate a violation took place after November 21,
1991, they may be able to receive damages for actions prior to
that time if they can show a pattern of discrimination that
dates back to a pre-1989 policy.
Before the 1989 decisions limiting the effect of Title VII and
§ 1981, the law was "sufficiently clear" that damages for dis-
criminatory conduct could date back to the first act in a pattern
of discrimination. Under the more liberal Bazemore rule, dam-
ages may be available from either the passage of the statute or
the beginning of the pattern of discrimination. Even under the
270. Id. at 905-10.
271. The date is now the later of when (1) the seniority system is adopted, (2) an
individual becomes subject to the system, or (3) an individual is injured by the appli-
cation of the system. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 112(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2)
(Supp. IV 1992).
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stricter Long or Evans rules, if the employer has reasonable
notice that the past acts were unlawful, damages are available
as long as a present violation exists.
This argument is strongest when applied to the purely reme-
dial portions of the Act such as section 101. Section 101 amend-
ed the § 1981 claims basis to the pre-Patterson understanding.
The pattern of discrimination is not disturbed even though the
employer did not believe his actions were illegal for the brief
time between the Patterson decision and the 1991 Act. Even
under the new damages provisions such as section 102, if a
present violative act can be shown, a pattern of unlawful
discrimination will exist from the time of the first act of
misconduct.
This argument is weakened by the Court's ruling in Landgraf
that the new damages provisions essentially create a new cause
of action even though the underlying conduct remained unlaw-
ful. The Court might likely rule that the latter situation is
similar to Long where the law was not sufficiently clear to put
the employer on notice of the new, higher damages.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Landgraf and Rivers retroactivity decisions undermine
the principle articulated in Long that the "make-whole purpose
of Title VH creates a 'presumption in favor of retroactive liabili-
ty [that] can seldom be overcome."272 This "make-whole" pur-
pose underlies all of the anti-discrimination suits amended by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Landgraf and Rivers decisions
set out a bright line test for the judicial presumption of the
retroactivity of statutes. If a statute affects vested rights, it can
not be presumed retroactive. This test, while defined vaguely, is
almost impossible to apply. In addition, it undermines issues of
fairness and reliance in individual cases.
272. Long, 487 U.S. at 242 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719
(1978)).
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A continuing violation theory may allow certain plaintiffs to
receive damages for past actions that would normally be un-
available under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 due to the Act's
nonretroactivity. The Court is unlikely to accept this argument
given its trend in the last five years to read employment
discrimination statutes restrictively. The Civil Rights Act of
1991 was an attempt to reverse some of the more restrictive
readings by the Court. Given the decisions in Landgraf and
Rivers, Congress may need to address these issues again in the
near future.
Leonard Charles Presberg
